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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Brian A. Albertson appeals the district court’s order denying his motion to
seal his criminal case record.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
In 2007, Albertson was charged by information with possession of
marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and two counts of possession of
methamphetamine. (R., pp. 36-37.) Pursuant to a plea bargain he pleaded
guilty to one count of possession of methamphetamine. (R., p. 39.) Albertson
was granted a withheld judgment and placed on probation for three years. (R.,
pp. 60-70.) Following a successful probation, Albertson moved to withdraw his
guilty plea and have his case dismissed. (R., pp. 75-77.) The state initially
opposed the motion (R., p. 80), but then informed the court it had no objection to
it (R., pp. 82-83). The court granted Albertson’s motion. (R., pp. 83-85.)
In 2016, Albertson filed a “Motion In Support Of Request To Seal The
Criminal Case Pursuant To Idaho Administrative Rule 32.” (R., pp. 86-87.) In it,
Albertson sought to seal the record in his case, noting that since his plea had
been withdrawn and case dismissed “I have attended college, graduating from
Independence University with a Masters Degree in Public Health Care Policy,”
and had accrued no other criminal convictions. (R., p. 86.) Albertson stated he
was “seeking a job in my field and the information contained on the Idaho
repository may inhibit my ability to find a job in my field.” (R., p. 86.)

1

Albertson reiterated these concerns when he spoke 1 to the court at the
hearing:
As she’s mentioned, I have completed a master’s degree. I have
three children. I’ve made it to every court hearing. I’ve completed
my probation with no violations. I’m getting to the point where I’m
applying for positions, and it gets to the point where I’m–“Have you
been convicted of a felony?” If I put yes, even though you’re not
automatically disqualified, it’s automatically disqualifying. If I put no
and they pulled my records, it shows that I was convicted of a
felony when the—the Court’s withheld judgment said that it would
be dismissed after the completion of probation. That’s all.
(Tr., p. 5, L. 15 – p. 6, L. 2.) The state did not object to Albertson’s motion.2 (Tr.,
p. 6, Ls. 5-18.)
In ruling on Albertson’s motion, the district court found that Albertson
“successfully completed his probation and, as a result, his plea of guilty was set
aside, and his case was dismissed,” and that “[h]e no longer has a felony
conviction as a matter of law.” (Tr., p. 7, L. 24 – p. 8, L. 3.) The court also noted
that “I don’t have any evidence before me at this time that Mr. Albertson has
been denied employment based upon the information in the repository. The
motion speculates that that could happen. He does wish to enter into the
healthcare field.” (Tr., p. 8, Ls. 8-13.)

1

Albertson was not sworn in and did not testify. (See Tr.) Similarly, his motion
to seal was not supported by any affidavits or other exhibits. (See R., pp. 86-87.)
2

Albertson characterizes the state’s position as having no objection and
“expressing that Mr. Albertson should get relief so long as it was in the court’s
power to grant such relief.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 1 (emphasis added).) But this is
incorrect; the prosecutor’s position was just that “the State would stand in no
objection,” and it “would not object to anything that the Court finds within its
power to do.” (Tr., p. 6, Ls. 5-18.)
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But the district court ultimately denied Albertson’s motion based on the
following analysis:
I guess this is my concern is I look at the privacy interests versus
the public’s constitutional right to know and—you know, and I
understand the concern regarding the felony conviction, but it could
also very easily be a question: “Have you ever had a substance
abuse problem?” And that’s a question that could be asked, and
certainly I would suspect that in the healthcare field it may be
asked. And this is my quandary: That Idaho has not exercised the
true expungement record, and I would say that if there was anyone
who ever appeared before me who deserved that, it would be you,
but I don’t believe that the rule goes that far.
And there was a similar circumstance in State vs. Allen, and,
unfortunately, I cannot say that the privacy interest is outweighed
by the public’s constitutional right to know, so I think at this point in
time, I have to deny it without prejudice. I’m sorry, sir.
(Tr., p. 8, L. 14 – p. 9, L. 8.)
The district court subsequently entered an order denying Albertson’s
motion. (R., p. 91.) Albertson timely appealed. (R., pp. 93-96.)
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ISSUE
Albertson states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Albertson’s
motion to seal his criminal case?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 5.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Albertson failed to show the district court erred in denying his motion to seal
his criminal case?

4

ARGUMENT
Albertson Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Denying His Motion To
Seal His Criminal Case
A.

Introduction
Albertson argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his

Rule 32(i) motion to seal his criminal case record. Specifically, he argues that
“the district court appears to have reasoned, in part, that because Mr. Albertson
failed to prove he was actually denied employment, he failed to make an
adequate showing under Rule 32(i)(2)(C).”

(Appellant’s brief, p. 10.)

Thus,

Albertson claims, “[b]y holding Mr. Albertson to a standard of showing actual
financial or economic harm, as opposed to the mere possibility of such harm,”
the district court applied an incorrect standard and erred.

(Appellant’s brief,

p. 10.)
This argument fails because the district court properly found that
Albertson’s privacy interest did not outweigh the public’s constitutional right to

5

know about his conviction.3 Further, like the appellant who was denied relief in
State v. Allen, 156 Idaho 332, 325 P.3d 673 (Ct. App. 2014), Albertson has failed
to show that it is the unsealed record, as opposed to the fact of the conviction,
that could harm his economic interests. Lastly, Albertson fails to show that the
district court erred by holding him to a standard of showing actual harm. For all
these reasons the district court’s denial of Albertson’s motion was not an abuse
of discretion.
B.

Standard Of Review
District court decisions to grant or deny relief under Idaho Court

Administrative Rule 32 are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Turpen,
147 Idaho 869, 872, 216 P.3d 627, 630 (2009); Allen, 156 Idaho at 336,
325 P.3d at 677.

3

The district court correctly explained the balancing test it would have to
perform. (Tr., p. 7, Ls. 1-5.) However, it seems the district court misstated its
actual holding when it found that “unfortunately, I cannot say that the privacy
interest is outweighed by the public’s constitutional right to know, so I think at this
point in time, I have to deny it without prejudice.” (Tr., p. 9, Ls. 3-8 (emphasis
added).) Plainly, the district court intended to say “the privacy interest
outweighs” or “the public’s constitutional right to know is outweighed by,”
otherwise, its denial of the motion makes no sense. Albertson appears to agree
with this reading of the holding, stating that the court “ultimately concluded that
Mr. Albertson failed to meet his burden, under Rule 32(i)(3), to show that the
harm to his economic or financial interests attendant to his case being available
to the public, outweighed the public’s interest in knowing about his case.”
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 3-4.) This brief will likewise proceed as if the district court
held it could not find Alberton’s privacy interests outweighed the public disclosure
interests, which its reasoning, conclusion, and order plainly show, but its
apparently mistaken explanation of the holding does not.
6

C.

The District Court Correctly Found That Albertson’s Privacy Interests Did
Not Outweigh The Public Interest In Disclosure And Therefore Correctly
Denied Albertson’s Motion To Seal His Criminal Case
The public has a First Amendment right to know what goes on in criminal

courts. Allen, 156 Idaho at 336, 325 P.3d at 677 (citing Richmond Newspapers,
Inc., v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980)). The Supreme Court has held that
the First Amendment does not just protect expressing ideas and disseminating
information, but receiving information and ideas. See Richmond Newspapers,
448 U.S. at 576 (citing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972)).
Indeed, “the First Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and the selfexpression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of
information from which members of the public may draw.”

Richmond

Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575-76 (quoting First National Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)).

Criminal proceedings are therefore

presumptively open, and “[a]bsent an overriding interest articulated in findings,
the trial of a criminal case must be open to the public.” Richmond Newspapers,
448 U.S. at 575-76, 581.
Consistent with the public’s constitutional right to know what transpires in
criminal proceedings, the Idaho Supreme Court, “pursuant to [its] authority to
control access to court records,” promulgated Idaho Court Administrative Rule
32. I.C.A.R. 32(a). The Court expressly stated its purpose for doing so:
The public has a right to access the judicial department’s
declarations of law and public policy, and to access the records of
all proceedings open to the public. This rule provides for access in
a manner that:
(1) Promotes accessibility to court records;

7

(2) Supports the role of the judiciary;
(3) Promotes governmental accountability;
(4) Contributes to public safety;
(5) Minimizes the risk of injury to individuals;
(6) Protects individual privacy rights and interests;
(7) Protects proprietary business information;
(8) Minimizes reluctance to use the court system;
(9) Makes the most effective use of court and clerk of court staff;
(10) Provides excellent customer service; and
(11) Avoids unduly burdening the ongoing business of the judiciary.
In the event of any conflict this rule shall prevail over any other rule
on the issue of access to judicial records.
Id.
Rule 32 strikes a balance “between the public’s constitutional right to
access criminal records and the privacy rights of individuals,” exempting from
disclosure “highly private information” such as PSI reports, jury questionnaires,
and documents identifying grand jurors. I.C.A.R. 32; Allen, 156 Idaho at 336,
325 P.3d at 677.
In very narrow circumstances court records may be sealed or redacted
“on a case-by-case basis” under Rule 32(i).

Districts courts do not have

“unfettered discretion to seal case files” under this rule; “rather, a court is only
allowed to seal portions of a case file after it finds that the petitioner’s privacy
interests predominate over the public’s constitutional right to know.” I.C.A.R.
32(i); Allen, 156 Idaho at 336, 325 P.3d at 677. Even then, “[i]f the court redacts
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or seals records to protect predominating privacy interests, it must fashion the
least restrictive exemption from disclosure consistent with privacy interests.”
I.C.A.R. 32(i)(1). Accordingly, before a district court may seal any portion of a
case file, it must first determine in writing:
(A)
That the documents or materials contain highly intimate
facts or statements, the publication of which would be highly
objectionable to a reasonable person, or
(B)
That the documents or materials contain facts or statements
that the court finds might be libelous, or
(C)
That the documents or materials contain facts or statements,
the dissemination or publication of which may compromise the
financial security of, or could reasonably result in economic or
financial loss or harm to, a person having an interest in the
documents or materials, or compromise the security of personnel,
records or public property of or used by the judicial department, or
(D)
That the documents or materials contain facts or statements
that might threaten or endanger the life or safety of individuals, or
(E)
That it is necessary to temporarily seal or redact the
documents or materials to preserve the right to a fair trial, or
(F)
That the documents contain personal data identifiers that
should have been redacted pursuant to Rule 2.6 of the Idaho Rules
of Civil Procedure, in which case the court shall order that the
documents be redacted in a manner consistent with the provisions
of that rule.
I.C.A.R. 32(i)(2).
Rule 32(i) “requires that the district court ‘hold a hearing on the motion’
and ‘determine and make a finding of fact as to whether the interest in privacy or
public disclosure predominates.’” State v. Gurney, 152 Idaho 502, 504, 272 P.3d
474, 476 (2012) (quoting I.C.A.R. 32(i)(1)).
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The district court here correctly concluded that the public interest in
disclosure predominated over any privacy interest that Albertson had in sealing
his records. Specifically, the court found that employers, particularly health care
employers, could justifiably want to know whether Albertson ever had a drug
addiction problem—a question on which a methamphetamine possession
conviction has self-evident bearing.

(See Tr., p. 8, Ls. 14-22.)

The court

reasoned that because Albertson would be seeking employment prospective
employers could “very easily” inquire, “Have you ever had a substance abuse
problem?” (Tr., p. 8, Ls, 18-20.) The district court further found that “certainly I
would suspect in the healthcare field” that such a question “may be asked.” (Tr.,
p. 8, Ls. 20-22.) Albertson was convicted of felony drug possession and given
the common-sense significance of this fact to employers—especially health care
employers—the court concluded that “I have to deny [Albertson’s motion] without
prejudice.” (Tr., p. 9, Ls. 4-8.) Considering the nature of Albertson’s crime it was
entirely reasonable for the district court to find that the public’s right to know
outweighed any claimed privacy interest.
Moreover, the district court correctly compared this case to State v. Allen.
(See Tr., p. 9, Ls. 3-8 (citing Allen, 156 Idaho 332, 325 P.3d 673).) There, it was
not the unsealed record of the conviction that harmed Allen’s interests, but the
fact of the conviction itself. This was first pointed out by the lower court:
Mr. Allen has not presented the Court with any “exceptional
circumstances” that would warrant the sealing of his criminal
records. While he believes that his disclosure to prospective
employers that he is a convicted felon hurts his chances for
employment, whether or not the court record is sealed has not
been shown to adversely affect his employment capabilities. Thus it
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appears that the major impediment to employment is the conviction
itself. This Court, in the exercise of its discretion, concludes that the
public interest in disclosure outweighs Mr. Allen’s interest in
privacy. Accordingly, his motion to seal his criminal records is
denied.
156 Idaho at 337, 325 P.3d at 678. The Allen Court affirmed the district court’s
ruling and its logic:
At the hearing on Allen’s motion, he testified that his economic
interests were harmed by having a felony conviction, asserting that
he could not obtain employment with government contractors due
to the existence of the felony conviction. He did not, however,
explain how the sealing of his record would make any difference.
Clearly, absent a dismissal or reduction of the felony conviction,
Allen would still be required to disclose to prospective employers
that he was a convicted felon, regardless of whether his file was
sealed. Even if Allen’s economic interests were affected by his
felony conviction, those interests were not affected due to any
legitimate privacy concerns.
Id. (emphasis added).
That holding squarely applies in this case. Albertson told the district court
that:
I’m getting to the point where I’m applying for positions, and it gets
to the point where I’m—“Have you been convicted of a felony?” If I
put yes, even though you’re not automatically disqualified, it’s
automatically disqualifying. If I put no and they pulled my records, it
shows that I was convicted of a felony when the—the Court’s
withheld judgment said that it would be dismissed after the
completion of probation. That’s all.
(Tr., p. 5, L. 18 – p. 6, L. 2.)
Note that the question at issue is “Have you been convicted of a felony.”
(Tr., p. 5, Ls. 18-21.)

Because Albertson once pleaded guilty to a felony,

regardless of whether his record is sealed now, the truthful answer to that
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question will always be “yes.”4 (See United States v. Sharp, 145 Idaho 403, 40407, 179 P.3d 1059, 1060-63 (2008)). And it is clear from Albertson’s statement to
the district court that the fact of the prior conviction is what jeopardizes his
response to potential employers:

Albertson must either answer “yes” and

disclose this “automatically disqualifying” fact, or alternatively, answer “no” and
risk an employer checking the repository and quickly discovering not only the fact
of the conviction, but that the application misstated it.

Given these

circumstances, a sealed record would only work to prevent employers from
verifying whether, if Albertson answers “no,” the answer is correct. This is not a
“legitimate privacy concern,” let alone a privacy concern that would outweigh the
public’s constitutional right to know about the conviction. Much like the appellant
in Allen, Albertson would still be required to disclose his conviction to employers,
regardless of the seal, and as such this dilemma is not a legitimate privacy
concern affecting his economic interests. See 156 Idaho at 337, 325 P.3d at

4

Albertson claims to the contrary that “if a job application asked, ‘Have you
previously been convicted of a felony,’ the truthful response would probably be
‘yes’.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 3, n. 2.) But given the legal standards it is unclear
why he contends this would only be “probably” so. Because Albertson previously
pleaded guilty to a felony, and because Idaho law treats a guilty plea as a
conviction even if later withdrawn pursuant to a withheld judgment, the truthful
answer to that question, or the similar question “have you been convicted of a
felony,” will invariably be “yes.” See Sharp, 145 Idaho at 404-07, 179 P.3d at
1060-63 (2008). (“Thus, a conviction occurs ‘by the verdict of a jury … or upon a
plea of guilty’ and it must precede punishment.”); State v. Wagenius, 99 Idaho
273, 278, 581 P.2d 319, 324 (1978) (“We conclude that for purposes of I.C.
§ 19-101 conviction occurs when a verdict or plea of guilty is accepted by the
court.”); see also State v. Glenn, 156 Idaho 22, 26, 319 P.3d 1191, 1195 (2014)
(“Instead, withdrawing a guilty plea and dismissing the case does not change the
fact that the defendant pled guilty or was found guilty.”).
12

678.

Based on the holding of Allen the district court thus correctly denied

Albertson’s motion.
On appeal, Albertson does not challenge the district court’s finding that
employers, and particularly health care employers, could justifiably want to know
whether he had a substance addiction problem.

(See generally, Appellant’s

brief.) Albertson focuses instead on the district court’s statements regarding his
claimed privacy interest.

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-10.)

He argues the court

abused its discretion “[b]y holding Mr. Albertson to a standard of showing actual
financial or economic harm, as opposed to the mere possibility of such harm,”
and in doing so “applied a more stringent standard than that called for under
Rule 32(i)(2)(C).” (Appellant’s brief, p. 10.) Albertson claims the district court’s
remarks that “I don’t have any evidence before me at this time that Mr. Albertson
had been denied employment,” and that Albertson “speculates” such a denial
could happen, show the district court erroneously holding him to a standard of
showing actual harm. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 9-10 (quoting Tr., p. 8, Ls. 8-12).)
This argument fails because at no point did the district court adopt a legal
standard that Albertson had to show actual harm. (See generally Tr.) Indeed, it
appears the court was simply reciting factual findings, and not creating a new
legal standard, when it observed the following:
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I don’t have any evidence before me at this time that Mr. Albertson
has been denied employment based upon the information in the
5
repository.[ ] The motion speculates that that could happen. He
does wish to enter into the healthcare field.
(Tr., p. 8, Ls. 8-13.) However, the district court never suggested that the actuality
of the harm had any effect on its analysis, let alone did it adopt a legal standard
that Rule 32(i) required Albertson to show actual harm. Instead, the court gave
every indication that it took Albertson’s claimed concerns at face value, but
simply concluded that the public interest outweighed them:
I guess this is my concern is I look at the privacy interests versus
the public’s constitutional right to know and -- you know, and I
understand the concern regarding the felony conviction, but it could
also very easily be a question: “Have you ever had a substance
abuse problem?”. . . .
(Tr., p. 8, Ls. 14-20 (emphasis added).) Albertson’s claim of error therefore fails
because he fails to show the district court placed any analytical significance on
the actuality of the harm. And Albertson falls far short of showing that the district
court abused its discretion by holding him, even implicitly, “to a standard of
showing actual financial or economic harm.” (See Appellant’s brief, p. 10.) The
district court here properly conducted a Rule 32(i) analysis when it balanced
Albertson’s privacy rights with the rights of the public to know about his crime,
and correctly denied his motion.

5

The court could have meant there was “no evidence” of job loss in two senses:
Albertson did not aver that he actually lost any job opportunities because of his
criminal record (R., pp. 86-87; Tr,. p. 3, L. 18 – p. 6, L. 2), and Albertson
arguably did not support his motion with any evidence in the form of affidavits,
sworn testimony, exhibits, or the like (R., pp. 86-87). Cf. State v. Cunningham,
161 Idaho 698, ___, 390 P.3d 424, 428 (2017) (holding that “unsworn
representations, even by an officer of the court, do not constitute ‘substantial
evidence’” upon which a restitution award could be predicated).
14

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court’s order
denying Albertson’s motion to seal.
DATED this 29th day of June, 2017.
_/s/ Kale D. Gans_________
KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 29th day of June, 2017, served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an
electronic copy to:
ERIK R. LEHTINEN
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

KDG/dd

_/s/ Kale D. Gans_________
KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General
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